• Enemy Front Proper

Enemy Front Proper Crack Only. This nut’s a little harder to crack, but let’s give it a try. Spiders, namely tarantulas, appear in a few different scenes. Crack cocaine is frequently purchased already in rock form, although it is not uncommon for some users to 'wash up' or 'cook' powder cocaine into crack. The original series claimed that, in order to help raise funds for efforts against the Nicaraguan Sandinista National Liberation Front Sandinista government, the CIA.

Brand new here, this is my first post. I recently tried using a lighter to 'melt' down some crack (power form unavailable at time), and, although I was able to draw up some liquid w/ a 30 gauge, 1/2', 100cc syringe, I noticed that there was still a great abundance of tiny rock and 'powder' particles left in the spoon, and, hence, when I shot up the liquid-which was probably 95% water-I didn't feel anything. But, even before shooting, I tried using a lighter like 3-4 more times, even used a small knife & then the plunger to 'soften up' the particles, but alas-no avail. If anyone knows why this happened/what I need to do differently in order to avoid this crap in the future, ANY help, ASAP, would be TREMENDOUSLY appreciated!!!: ). How much vinegar is necessary?

I mean, like, is there a certain ratio that exists? Of, say, volume (mL, etc.)/mass(grams)= volume/mass= (mL/grams)??? Also, quickly, how long would I have to wait to do coke after taking my suboxone (8mg, 2x a day, a.m/p.m)? Is there anything you can do to speed it up, or, better yet, anything you can do to greatly reduce-if not eliminate entirely-the effects of sublingually administered suboxone, like swallow it, exercise, slam a shit ton of water right after it dissolves? PLEASE help me, please! Distilled vinegar is usually 5% acetic acid. If you want to prepare a 50mg shot of crack, and it's 75% pure (only 37.5mg of cocaine freebase in the rocks you call crack), you'll want 0.19g of vinegar.

The atomic mass of cocaine freebase is near 300, the atomic mass of acetic acid near 60, so you want a ratio of 5:1 cocaine to acetic acid by weight so that there's an equal number of each molecule in the solution. The density of 5% distilled vinegar is around 1g/mL, so you are going to want 0.19mL aka 0.19 cc of vinegar in a spoon and then pour the cocaine into it and mix it around and heat a little (don't let the water approach 200 degrees Fahrenheit!). After a few minutes it's ready to inject, as it should be a fairly neutral pH solution of cocaine acetate in water in the spoon if you calculated everything properly. ^ Is it really? I have no experience with IV'ing anything, but I would imagine smoking would hit you just as fast, if not even faster.

When you smoke something, it's straight to lungs - heart - systemic circulation - brain. However, if you IV something, it goes basically to the heart - pulmonary circulation - lungs - heart - systemic circulation - brain. So it would actually take longer for the drugs to hit the brain, no?

My guess is that people who find better rush in IVing than smoking are simply used to IVing stuff and are feeling the placebo effect. In reality, it shouldn't make much of a difference. I could be wrong, however, as I've never IV'd anything in my life. Yes, it is a very intense high, but, YOU HAVE TO BE CAREFUL because you never know the potency of the crack and I have seen people shoot crack and almost die.I know of person that died here in Greer, SC where I live that were in a dope house shooting up crack and one of them od'd and the person running the house literally kicked him out the front door in to the snow(one of our rare snowfalls) seriously - it was a a bad situation. The boy was in rehab and had a pass to go home for the weekend.and everyone is right about the vinegar(in a bind, lemon juice) but don't miss or that S.T will burn like hell, if you hit the vein right, you'll never know vinegar was in it(as far as the burn), but vinegar is hell on your veins, so don't do this all the time.unfortunately, I know I good bit about this.but I prefer to shoot opiates.

Heat is an enemy of Cocaine. People who shoot powder Cocaine Hydrochloride do not add heat (some do, but out of a cultural 'this is the way we do things in my town' thing, not because it is good for anything). Crack is solid Cocaine freebase. It has to be converted back to a water-soluble salt before it can be injected. Ascorbic Acid (the ingredient in Vitamin C capsules), Citric Acid (powdered or liquid) or in a pinch white vinegar (5% Acetic Acid) are the safest options. Mix with water and stir the crack, acid and water.

Cocaine overdose is very common and very deadly, especially with IV administration. A single dose of crack contains multiple shots worth of Cocaine.

Injecting an entire rock of unknown purity could be fatal, or result in very unpleasant symptoms (projectile vomiting, etc). Cocaine users that inject intravenous can overdose accidentally as the margin between an optimal rush and an overdose is small. This seems to work well 1) put bit of cold or room temperature water in spoon - about 1 ml or so 2) cut off piece of rock about the size of a hit you'd smoke (and certainly no bigger!), and chop it up 3) add the chopped up rock to the water; you should notice it floating or sinking or whatever, but NOT dissolving.if it dissolves at this stage, it's not rock cola 4) add citric acid powder, a tiny bit at a time, stirring the solution as you go.

You should see the rock start to dissolve as you add the acid and stir. Keep adding tiny bits of acid, stirring, and waiting to see if its all dissolved. 5) When all the rock is dissolved, filter with a q-tip or whatever, suck it up, and let 'er rip! JUST DON'T MISS!!!! Anyone else have any luck with the above procedure? Peace, and be safe!:).

Lol first of all I would never shoot anything, if I did it would had to be something absolutely free of any adulterant. Anyways I hope your coke is the purest you can get. So you wanna shoot it up. Well you must first dissolve your crack in anhydorus acetone (look up solubility of freebase coke in acetone), stir well and filter out undissolved shit. Then you add 1:1 HCL/ethanol till no more HCL cocaine precipitates Filter, dry completely and chop. Wait till it dries really well and then you're done. AND USE DISTILLED WATER, NOT VINEGAR (ACETIC ACID IN YOUR VEINS?

Main article: Communists were active throughout rural and urban Colombia in the period immediately following. The ( Partido Comunista Colombiano, PCC) was formally accredited by the in 1930.

The PCC began establishing 'peasant leagues' in rural areas and 'popular fronts' in urban areas, calling for improved living and working conditions, education, and rights for the working class. These groups began networking together to present a defensive front against the state-supported violence of large landholders. Members organized strikes, protests, seizures of land, and organized communist-controlled 'self-defense communities' in southern Colombia that were able to resist state military forces, while providing for the subsistence needs of the populace. Many of the PCC's attempts at organizing peasants were met with violent repression by the Colombian government and the landowning class. Military intelligence estimated that in 1962, the size of the PCC had grown to 8,000 to 10,000 active members, and an additional 28,000 supporters. In 1961, a guerrilla leader and long-time PCC organizer named declared an independent 'Republic of Marquetalia'.

The Lleras government attempted unsuccessfully to attack the communities to drive out the guerrillas, due to fears that 'a Cuban-style might develop'. After the failed attacks, several army outposts were set up in the area. Plan Lazo In October 1959, the sent a 'Special Survey Team' composed of experts to investigate Colombia's internal security situation. Among other policy recommendations the US team advised that 'to shield the interests of both Colombian and US authorities against 'interventionist' charges any special aid given for internal security was to be sterile and covert in nature'.

In February 1962, three years after the 1959 'US Special Survey Team', a Fort Bragg top-level U.S. Special Warfare team headed by Special Warfare Center commander General, visited Colombia for a second survey. In a secret supplement to his report to the, Yarborough encouraged the creation and deployment of a US-backed force to commit ', and/or activities against known communist proponents'. The new counter-insurgency policy was instituted as in 1962 and called for both military operations and in violent areas. Following Yarborough's recommendations, the Colombian military recruited civilians into 'civil defense' groups which worked alongside the military in its counter-insurgency campaign, as well as in civilian intelligence networks to gather information on guerrilla activity.

Argues that it was not until the early part of the 1980s that the Colombian government attempted to move away from the counterinsurgency strategy represented by Plan Lazo and Yarborough's 1962 recommendations. The Colombian government began attacking many of the communist groups in the early 1960s, attempting to re-assimilate the territories under the control of the national government. FARC was formed in 1964 by and other PCC members, after a military. 16,000 Colombian troops attacked the community, which only had 48 armed fighters. Marulanda and 47 others fought against government forces at Marquetalia, and then escaped into the mountains along with the other fighters.

These 48 men formed the core of FARC, which later grew in size to hundreds of fighters. Seventh Guerrilla Conference of the FARC-EP. Main article: FARC-EP was not initially involved in direct drug cultivation, trafficking, or trans-shipment prior to or during the 1980s. Instead, it maintained a system of taxation on the production that took place in the territories that they controlled, in exchange for protecting the growers and establishing law and order in these regions by implementing its own rules and regulations. During the 1990s, FARC expanded its operations, in some areas, to include trafficking and production, which had provided a significant portion of its funding. Right-wing paramilitary groups also receive a large portion of their income from drug trafficking and production operations. A 1992 report 'acknowledged that the FARC had become increasingly involved in drugs through their 'taxing' of the trade in areas under their geographical control and that in some cases the insurgents protected trafficking infrastructure to further fund their insurgency', but also described the relationship between the FARC and the drug traffickers as one 'characterized by both cooperation and friction' and concluded that 'we do not believe that the drug industry in Colombia would be substantially disrupted in the short term by attacks against guerrillas.

Indeed, many traffickers would probably welcome, and even assist, increased operations against insurgents.' In 1994, the (DEA) came to three similar conclusions.

First, that any connections between drug trafficking organizations and Colombian insurgents were 'ad hoc 'alliances of convenience'. Second, that 'the independent involvement of insurgents in Colombia's domestic drug productions, transportation, and distribution is limited. There is no evidence that the national leadership of either the FARC or the has directed, as a matter of policy, that their respective organizations directly engage in independent illicit drug production, transportation, or distribution.' Third, the report determined that the DEA 'has no evidence that the FARC or ELN have been involved in the transportation, distribution, or marketing of illegal drugs in the United States. Furthermore it is doubtful that either insurgent group could develop the international transportation and logistics infrastructure necessary to establish independent drug distribution in the United States or Europe. DEA believes that the insurgents never will be major players in Colombia's drug trade.'

FARC had called for crop substitution programs that would allow coca farmers to find alternative means of income and subsistence. In 1999, FARC worked with a United Nations alternative development project to enable the transition from coca production to sustainable food production. On its own, the group had also implemented programs in Putumayo.

In those FARC-EP controlled territories that do produce coca, it is generally grown by peasants on small plots; in paramilitary or government controlled areas, coca is generally grown on large plantations. The FARC-EP generally made sure that peasant coca growers receive a much larger share of profits than the paramilitaries would give them, and demanded that traffickers pay a decent wage to their workers. When growers in a FARC-controlled area were caught selling coca to non-FARC brokers, they were generally forced to leave the region, but when growers were caught selling to FARC in paramilitary-controlled areas, they were generally killed. Lower prices paid for raw coca in paramilitary-controlled areas lead to significantly larger profits for the drug processing and trafficking organizations, which means that they generally prefer that paramilitaries control an area rather than FARC. In 2000, FARC Spokesman said that taxes on drug laboratories represented an important part of the organization's income, although he didn't say how much it was. He defended this funding source, arguing that drug trade was endemic in Colombia because it had pervaded many sectors of its economy.

After the 21 April 2001 capture of Brazilian drug lord (a.k.a. Fernandinho Beira-Mar) in Colombia, Colombian and Brazilian authorities accused him of cooperating with FARC-EP through the exchange of weapons for cocaine. They also claimed that he received armed protection from the guerrilla group. On 18 March 2002 the indicted leaders of the FARC after an 18-month investigation into their narcotics trafficking., the commander of the FARC's 16th Front, led the 16th Front's drug-trafficking activities together with Carlos Bolas and a rebel known as Oscar El Negro.

Between 1994 and 2001, Molina and other 16th Front members controlled Barranco Minas, where they collected cocaine from other FARC fronts to sell it to international drug traffickers for payment in currency, weapons and equipment. On 22 March 2006 the Attorney General Alberto Gonzales announced the indictment of fifty leaders of FARC for exporting more than $25 billion worth of cocaine to the United States and other countries. Several of the FARC leaders appeared on the Justice Department's Consolidated Priority Organization target list, which identifies the most dangerous international drug trafficking organizations. Recognizing the increased profits, the FARC moved to become directly involved in the manufacture and distribution of cocaine by setting the price paid for cocaine paste and transporting it to jungle laboratories under FARC control.

The charged FARC leaders ordered that Colombian farmers who sold paste to non-FARC buyers would be murdered and that U.S. Fumigation planes should be shot down.

On 11 October 2012 Jamal Yousef, a.k.a. 'Talal Hassan Ghantou', a native of, was sentenced to 12 years in prison for conspiring to provide military-grade weapons to the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (the FARC), in exchange for over a ton of. Yousef pleaded guilty in May 2012 to one count of providing material support to the FARC. Kidnappings. 2012 car bombing targeting the former minister. FARC was accused of committing violations of human rights by numerous groups, including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the United Nations as well as by the Colombian, U.S. And European Union governments.

A February 2005 report from the United Nations' mentioned that, during 2004, 'FARC-EP continued to commit grave breaches of human rights such as murders of protected persons, torture and hostage-taking, which affected many civilians, including men, women, returnees, boys and girls, and ethnic groups.' Child soldiers FARC-EP, the ELN and right-wing paramilitaries all trained teens as soldiers and informants. Estimates that the FARC-EP had the majority of in Colombia, and that approximately one quarter of its guerrillas were under 18. Forcible recruitment of children, by either side, was rare in Colombia. They joined for a variety of reasons including poverty, lack of educational opportunities, avoiding dangerous work in coca processing, escaping from domestic violence, offers of money (mostly from paramilitaries, who pay their soldiers). Human Rights Watch noted that 'once integrated into the FARC-EP, children are typically barred from leaving'.

FARC-EP Commander has stated that FARC did not allow the enlistment of people under 15 years of age, arguing that this is in accordance with Article 38 of the United Nations'. He also argued that the alternatives for many children in Colombia are worse, including prostitution and exploitative work in mines and coca production. Has rejected the validity of such a position in international law. In June 2000, FARC-EP Commander told Human Rights Watch that the minimum recruitment age of fifteen years was set in 1996 but admitted that 'this norm was not enforced' until recently. Lozada said, however, that it had become an obligatory standard after Commander 's statements on the matter in April 2000. A 2001 Human Rights Watch report considered FARC-EP's refusal to admit children under fifteen years old into their forces to be 'encouraging' but added that there is 'little evidence that this rule is being strictly applied' and called on the group to demobilize all existing child soldiers and cease this practice in the future. In 2003, Human Rights Watch reported that FARC-EP showed no leniency to children because of their age, assigning minors the same duties as adults and sometimes requiring them to participate in executions or witness torture.

Extrajudicial executions FARC consistently carried out attacks against civilians specifically targeting suspected supporters of paramilitary groups, political adversaries, journalists, local leaders, and members of certain indigenous groups since at least as early as 1994. From 1994 to 1997 the region of in was the site of FARC attacks against civilians. FARC has also executed civilians for failing to pay 'war taxes' to their group. In 2001, (HRW) announced that the FARC-EP had abducted and executed civilians accused of supporting paramilitary groups in the and elsewhere, without providing any legal defense mechanisms to the suspects and generally refusing to give any information to relatives of the victims. The human rights NGO directly investigated three such cases and received additional information about over twenty possible executions during a visit to the zone. According to HRW, those extrajudicial executions would qualify as if they had been carried out by agents of the government or on its behalf, but nevertheless remained 'blatant violations of the FARC-EP's obligations under international humanitarian law and in particular key provisions of article 4 of Protocol II, which protects against violence to the life, physical, and mental well-being of persons, torture, and ill-treatment'. The Colombian human rights organization CINEP reported that FARC-EP killed an estimated total of 496 civilians during 2000.

Enemy Front Proper

Use of gas cylinder mortars and landmines The FARC-EP has employed a type of improvised made from gas canisters (or cylinders), when launching attacks. According to, the FARC-EP has killed civilians not involved in the conflict through the use of gas cylinder mortars and its use of. Considers that 'the FARC-EP's continued use of gas cylinder mortars shows this armed group's flagrant disregard for lives of civilians.gas cylinder bombs are impossible to aim with accuracy and, as a result, frequently strike civilian objects and cause avoidable civilian casualties.'

According to the Landmine and Cluster Munitions Monitor, 'FARC is probably the most prolific current user of antipersonnel mines among rebel groups anywhere in the world.' Furthermore, FARC use child soldiers to carry and deploy antipersonnel mines. Violence against indigenous people FARC sometimes threatened or assassinated indigenous Colombian leaders for attempting to prevent FARC incursions into their territory and resisting the forcible recruitment by FARC of indigenous youth. Between 1986 and 2001, FARC was responsible for 27 assassinations, 15 threats, and 14 other abuses of indigenous people in Antioquia Department.

Yeh pehli baar hua, yeh kyu ehasas hua, Jaane anjaane kyu muje tumse pyaar hua. Yeh pehli baar hua, yeh kyu ehasas hua, Mera dil tut raha, ise bas ab tutne do. Kaisi yeh judai hai aankh bhar meri aayi hai mp3 download mr jatt. Kaisi yeh judaai hai, aankh bhar meri aayi hai, Mera dil doob raha, ise bas ab doobne do. Mujhe bas ab rone do, is gum ko behne do, Yeh saath jo tut raha, ise aaj chhutne do. Ek baat satati hai, jab teri yaad aati hai, Kyu mujhse rooth gaya, jaane kyu door gaya.

In March 1999 members of a local FARC contingent killed 3 indigenous rights activists, who were working with the U'Wa people to build a school for U'Wa children, and were fighting against encroachment of U'Wa territory by multinational oil corporations. The killings were almost universally condemned, and seriously harmed public perceptions of FARC. Members of indigenous groups have demanded the removal of military bases set up by the Colombian government and guerrilla encampments established by FARC in their territories, claiming that both the and the FARC should respect indigenous autonomy and international humanitarian law. According to a 2012 research from the (ONIC), 80,000 members of indigenous communities have been displaced from their native lands since 2004 because of FARC-related violence. Luis Evelis, an indigenous leader and ONIC representative, has stated that 'the armed conflict is still in force, causing damages to the indigenous.

Our territories are self-governed and we demand our. During the year 2011, fifty-six indigenous people have been killed.' The has indicated that no military activities may be carryed out within indigenous territories without first undertaking an 'effective consultation' with indigenous representatives and authorities from the communities involved. The Regional Indigenous Council of (CRIC) issued a statement concerning the release of two hostages taken by FARC in 2011: 'Compared to past statements made by the national government, it is important to reiterate that the presence of armed groups in our territories is a fact that has been imposed by force of arms, against which our communities and their leaders have remained in peaceful resistance.'

The CRIC also indicated that neither the Colombian government nor the mediators and armed groups involved consulted with the indigenous people and their authorities about the hostage release, raising concerns about the application of national and international law guaranteeing their autonomy, and self-government. The indigenous organization also demanded the immediate end of all violence and conflict within indigenous territories and called for a negotiated solution to the war. Official Colombian government statistics show that murders of indigenous people between January and May 2011 have increased 38% compared to the same timeframe in 2010. Colombia is home to nearly 1 million indigenous people, divided into around 100 different ethnicities.

The Colombian Constitutional Court has warned that 35 of those groups are in danger of dying out. The Permanent Assembly for the Defense of Life and Territorial Control has stated that the armed conflict 'is not only part of one or two areas, it is a problem of all the indigenous people.' Sexual abuse and forced abortions According to it has been reported that young female recruits were sexually abused by veteran guerrilla soldiers and in several cases pregnancies were aborted against their will by FARC doctors. Organization and structure.

From the beginning of their training, both guerrilla and paramilitary child recruits were taught to treat the other side’s fighters or sympathizers without mercy. Adults order children to kill, mutilate, and torture, conditioning them to the cruelest abuses. Not only do children face the same treatment should they fall into the hands of the enemy, many fear it from fellow fighters. Children who fail in their military duties or try to desert can face summary execution by comrades sometimes no older than themselves. Source: “YOU’LL LEARN NOT TO CRY” Child Combatants in Colombia See also.